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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Fortunately, litigation involving failure to obtain the necessary
consent is rare. As a matter of policy, many corporations ask for
shareholder approval when an important disposition is made, re-
gardless of whether consent is required. Obviously, this policy is
desirable, and the fact that consent is granted does not affect a
subsequent claim for appraisal rights. Unfortunately, shareholder
approval is not always possible. In such situations, the directors
should have the power to make necessary dispositions, unless the
sale, not in the furtherance of the actual business of the corpora-
tion, destroys the corporation's ability to continue its present opera-
tions. Such an approach reaches the desired practical balance be-
tween protecting the shareholder's investment and having an effi-
cient centralized management.
RIcHARD G. ELLIOTT, JR.
Credit Transactions-Mortgages and Deeds of Trust-Application of
Statute of Limitations to Promise of Assuming Grantee
Debtors gave notes secured by deeds of trust on certain realty.
Seven years thereafter, during which period no payments of either
principal or interest had been made on the obligations, the equity
of redemption in the land was conveyed to grantee who thereupon
executed an instrument acknowledging that the land was encum-
bered by the deeds of trust, that no payments had been made to date,
and further that he agreed "to pay the full sum of both notes ...
together with all accrued interest thereon."' This instrument was
attached to the notes and deeds of trust found among the valuable
papers of the creditor after his death. Five years after the con-
veyance to the grantee, there still having been no payments on the
obligations, the defendant trustee attempted to exercise the power of
sale contained in the first of the deeds of trust, and this action was
instituted by debtors and their grantee to restrain such foreclosure.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Lowe v. Jackson,2 affirmed
the trial court's judgment granting the injunction. The grantee's
338 (1961); Garvin v. Pythian Mut. Industrial Ass'n, 263 S.W.2d 114
(Ky. 1953) (lapse of fourteen years).Alhambra-Shumway Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine Corp., 200
Cal. App. 2d 322, 19 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1962); Elster v. American Airlines,
Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 213, 128 A.2d 801 (1957).
1 Lowe v. Jackson, 263 N.C. 634, 635, 140 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1965).
2263 N.C. 634, 140 S.E.2d 1 (1965).
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agreement to assume the indebtedness was not a novation of the
notes and deeds of trust; thus, exercise of the power of sale was
barred by the ten year statute of limitations, there having been no
payment to interrupt the running of the period.
The case presents the interesting and perplexing question: should
the promise of assumption made by a grantee of encumbered lands be
sufficient to start anew the running of limitations against him and
the security in his hands, even though the circumstances fall short
of a novation? The answer, in the vast majority of jurisdictions
which have considered the question, has been in the affirmative.'
As put by Professor Osborne:
Although a grantee should not be able to bind the mortgagor
by any acts which have the effect of extending or reviving the
statute of limitations, he clearly should be able to and can bind
himself and the property he acquired. If he is an assuming
grantee his act will affect his personal liability as well as the
time within which the mortgage can be enforced against the
property. Indeed, the very act of assuming or of taking subject
to the mortgage is one which starts a new period of limitations
so far as rights against the grantee [are concerned] .4
While the indicated result seems generally accepted, there has been
disparity in the rationale given by the courts. Some have held that
the assuming grantee is estopped to assert the lapse of that portion
of the period which occurred prior to the conveyance.5 The better-
reasoned cases, however, have relied upon the principle that the
liability of the grantee arises from an agreement independent of
that between the grantor and the creditor, and that limitations
obviously cannot begin to run on liability before that liability is
created.6
'E.g., Holmes v. Bennett, 14 Ariz. 298, 127 Pac. 753 (1912); Daniels
v. Johnson, 129 Cal. 415, 61 Pac. 1107 (1900); Simon v. McMeel, 167 La.
243, 119 So. 35 (1928); Tuthill v. Stoehr, 163 Ore. 461, 98 P.2d 8 (1940);
Holcroft v. Wheatley, 112 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). For the
proposition that assumption revives a mortgage already barred, see Davis
v. Davis, 19 Cal. App. 797, 127 Pac. 1051 (Dist. Ct. App. 1912). See
generally Annot., 142 A.L.R. 615 (1943); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 1027 (1922);
11 CALIF. L. REv. 429 (1923); 51 COLUA. L. RPv. 1030 (1951).
'OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 299, at 859 (1951).
'Hunt v. Lyndonville Say. Bank & Trust Co., 103 F.2d 852 (8th Cir.
1939); Davis v. Davis, 19 Cal. App. 797, 127 Pac. 1051 (Dist. Ct. App.
1912).
'Holmes v. Bennett, 14 Ariz. 298, 127 Pac. 753 (1912); Daniels v.
Johnson, 129 Cal. 415, 61 Pac. 1107 (1900); Schmucker v. Sibert, 18
Kan. 104 (1877).
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In North Carolina, as in most other jurisdictions, the law in
the fields of limitation and foreclosure is largely statutory. 7 Of
primary concern in this state are sections 1-47(3)8 and 45-21.12'
of the General Statutes. The first of these provides that actions
for foreclosure must be brought within ten years "after the for-
feiture of the mortgage, or after the power of sale has become ab-
solute, or . . . after the last payment on the same."' Since it was
held for many years that foreclosure under a power of sale was
not an "action" within the meaning of this statute," section 45-
21.122 was enacted providing that the right to exercise any power
of sale is barred where a corresponding "action" would have been
barred.
The court in the principal case first concluded that there was no
novation of the mortgage contract. This had been determined by
the trial court,' 3 and no exception had been taken thereto by the
defendant.' 4 Quoting from Strong's North Carolina Index," the
court said: "A debt assumption agreement by the purchaser of the
equity of redemption is not a novation of the mortgage note, there
being no element of a further consideration passing between the
parties or a substitution of a new for an old or subsisting debt."' 0
Then, applying the statutes discussed above, it was concluded that
"the right to exercise any power of sale contained in a deed of
trust is barred after ten years from the maturity of any note or notes
secured thereby, where no payments have been made thereon ex-
tending the statute."
7
Thus, it appears that, as against an assuming grantee, the court
" The statutes vary as to what acts of the parties will lead to interrup-
tion of the period. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(3) (1953) with 12
OKLA STAT. ANN. § 101 (1960) which starts the statute running over
"when apy part of principal or interest shall have been paid, or acknowledg-
ment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same
shall have been made. .. ."
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(3) (1953).
* N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.12 (1950).
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(3) (1953).
" See Cone v. Hyatt, 132 N.C. 810, 44 S.E. 678 (1903); Menzel v.
Hinton, 132 N.C. 660, 44 S.E. 385 (1903). See also 17 N.C.L. Rrv. 448
(1939).
1" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.12 (1950).
23 263 N.C. at 636, 140 S.E.2d at 2.
14 Ibid.
I 3 STRONG, INDEX TO THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT REPORTS,
Mortgages & Deeds of Trust § 14 (1960).
2 263 N.C. at 636-37, 140 S.E.2d at 3.
11 Id. at 637, 140 S.E.2d at 3. (Emphasis added.)
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recognizes two methods whereby the bar of the statute may be
extended beyond ten years from the date of maturity of the original
obligation. First, it is implicit in the language of the Lowe decision
quoted above,"" as well as in that of section 1-47(3), that a payment
on the obligation would have interrupted the statute. 9 Second, the
statute would have run anew had there been a novation. In the
instant litigation there had been no payments whatever; and it was
obvious that the intentions and acts of the parties fell far short of
a novation that would have discharged the grantor from the con-
tract altogether. And since the case was apparently tried and ap-
pealed solely upon the theory of novation, it is difficult to find fault
with the decision reached. But the language of the court seems to
indicate that the two methods discussed are the only means whereby
the statute may be interrupted in a mortgage-assumption case.20
If this is true, then it is submitted that the Lowe opinion is open
to serious question; for the North Carolina limitations statutes,
when viewed as a whole, do not seem to require any such conclusion.
There appear to be at least two arguments based upon the
statutes that could be successfully advanced in behalf of those in
the position of this secured creditor. First: In section 1-26,1
it is provided that a written acknowledgment of an obligation,
made to the creditor22 and signed by the person to be charged,
will start the statutory period running over from the date of such
acknowledgment. Clearly, had there been no conveyance in the
principal case, and had this acknowledgment been made instead
" See text accompanying note 17 supra.
"o See Harper v. Edwards, 115 N.C. 246, 20 S.E. 392 (1894), where it
was held that payments by an assuming grantee on the obligation arrested
the running of the statute. For the effect of such a payment upon the
liability of the grantor, see the discussion in note 27 infra.
'"In its opinion, the court quotes the following language from Spain v.
Hines, 214 N.C. 432, 434, 200 S.E. 25, 27 (1938): "The evidence ... shows
no payment or other tranmaction which would take the note out of the bar
of the statute of limitations. . . ." 263 N.C. at 637, 140 S.E.2d at 3.
(Emphasis added.) The court thus recognizes that there are "other trans-
actions" which would interrupt the running of the statutory period, but it
is not clear whether or not novation is the only "other transaction."1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-26 (1953).
"' The cases construing the statute have held that, in order to repel the
statute, the promise or acknowledgment must be made to the creditor or
his agent. See, e.g., Hussey v. Kirkman, 95 N.C. 63 (1886). In the prin-
cipal case, it is not made clear to whom the assumption promise was ad-
dressed, but the fact that the instrument was found among the papers of the
deceased creditor, attached to the notes and deeds of trust, indicate strongly
that the promise was in fact directed to him.
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by the original debtor, the period would have been interrupted.2"
Equally clear is the fact that a payment on the obligation made by
either the grantor24 or grantee25 would have had similar effect.
"A payment of part of a debt resting upon a promise has the same
effect in continuing or reviving it, as a new promise itself; and
the very act is deemed a promise to pay the residue."2 Part pay-
ment, then, is equivalent to a new promise to pay. And, if a pay-
mnent by a grantee interrupts the statute because it is deemed equiv-
alent to his written promise to pay, then it follows logically that his
actual written promise should effect the same result. It must be re-
membered that, while the statute would be interrupted where the
grantee made a payment, such payment would not work a novation
-the grantor would remain a party to the obligation." It seems
that grantor could also remain a party where grantee made a promise
instead of a payment. Thus, grantee's assumption ought to re-start
the statute, notwithstanding the absence of novation.
Second: The same result may be reached by employing a slightly
different approach. In a dictum in the Lowe opinion, the court,
while analyzing the relationships among the parties after an as-
sumption agreement, again quoted from Strong's Index~s to the
following effect:
As between the mortgagor and his grantee assuming the debt,
the mortgagor is a surety. But as between the mortgagor and
mortgagee he remains primarily liable for the mortgage debt
... even though the mortgagee... extends the time of payment
without notice to the mortgagor.29
This is an accurate statement of the law as it existed in North
Carolina for many years.30 In 1961, however, this rule was changed
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-26 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-26, 1-47(3) (1953).
" See Harper v. Edwards, 115 N.C. 246, 20 S.E. 392 (1894).
" McDonald v. Dickson, 87 N.C. 404, 406 (1882) (a case not involving
a mortgage assumption).
- Although the grantor would remain a party, he would not be bound
by a revival of the statutory period occasioned by his grantee's acknowl-
edgment or payment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-27 (Supp. 1963). See generally
Pickett v. Rigsbee, 252 N.C. 200, 113 S.E.2d 323 (1960).
" 3 STRONG, op. cit. supra note 15, Mortgages & Deeds of Trust § 15,
at 336.
"263 N.C. at 637, 140 S.E.2d at 3.
8o See Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Carson, 207 N.C. 495, 177 S.E. 335




materially by a statute3 ' that puts the grantor in the position of a
surety not only as to the assuming grantee, but as to the mortgagee
as well. While this enactment has no direct application to the prob-
lem at hand, it does make the liability of the assuming grantee
primary. By virtue of his assumption of the indebtedness, the
grantee becomes the principal debtor, the grantor remaining on
the obligation as surety. With this in mind, it seems that under
section 1-26, the grantee is also the "party to be charged" 2 on the
acknowledged obligation, and that his promise should therefore be
one which would interrupt the running of the statute.
Reasoning either that the written promise of the grantee is, for
the purposes of the statute of limitations, as effective as a payment
by him, or that the grantee's act of assumption renders him the
principal debtor so that his promise is an acknowledgment by the
person to be charged, it becomes abundantly clear that the statutes
permit interruption of the period as against an assuming grantee
in three ways: (1) by part payment on the obligation or (2) by a
written promise to assume it, both of which fall short of a novation,
and (3) by a true novation agreement. It appears that the defendant
in the principal case, instead of electing to ground his case entirely
upon the theory of novation, might well have profited by urging
upon the court arguments similar to the ones outlined. More im-
portantly, however, it may be that the court in Lowe has established
a precedent dangerous to future litigants.3 It is therefore submitted
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-45.1 (Supp. 1963). The provisions of the
statute are summarized as follows:
[W]here there is an assuming grantee an extension of time to him or
his release by the secured creditor discharges the mortgagor or grantor,
and a release of any of the security property by the creditor or the
trustee acting for him releases the mortgagor or grantor to the extent
of the value of the property released. When the property is sold
expressly subject to the mortgage or deed of trust, but the grantee
does not assume it, the binding extension of time releases the mortgagor
or grantor to the extent of the value of the property; and the release
of any of the security property releases the mortgagor or grantor to
the extent of the value of the property released.
Hanft, Credit Transactions-Some Statutory Changes in 1961, 40 N.C.L.
Rxv. 82, 84 (1961).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-26 (1953).
"' See note 20 supra. It bears repeating at this point that the court, in a
case where the question is squarely and properly raised, may well find that
an assumption agreement is one of the "other transactions" from which the
statute will run anew. The statements of the court to date do not preclude
such a result; and it could be reached without the necessity of overruling
established precedent.
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that while the conclusion in Lowe was apparently inescapable, its use
as precedent should not be extended beyond cases identical to it
in all essential elements.
HENRY STANCILL MANNING, JR.
Criminal Law-Admissibility of Confessions
Davis, a prison escapee, was captured by police, who requested
and received permission of the warden of the state prison to keep
him temporarily in their custody. They suspected him of a recent
rape-murder. On Davis's being delivered to the city jail a notation
was made upon the arrest sheet that he was not to be allowed to use
the telephone and that no one was to be allowed to see him. Davis
was held in the city jail for the next sixteen days. During that time,
according to trial court findings, he was adequately fed, never
threatened, and, though questioned daily, not questioned overbear-
ingly.' On the sixteenth day of his detention, while he was being
questioned alone by a police officer acquainted with him and his
family, the officer made reference to a Bible held by Davis. Upon
inquiry he learned that Davis had been reading from the Bible, but
had not been praying because he did not know how. The police
officer recited a short, innocuous prayer. A moment later, Davis
confessed to the rape-murder.2
In December of 1959 Davis was convicted of the offense largely
on the basis of his confession. As is the practice in North Carolina,
determination of the "voluntariness" 3 of the confession was made by
' The facts as alleged by the prosecution and as alleged by defendant are
in complete conflict. Davis contended the instruction on the arrest sheet
was carried out; the state that it was ignored, which the trial court so held.
The defendant alleged that incarceration in the city jail was improper since
it was only an "over-night" jail and that prisoners held for more than a
day or two were normally detained in the county jail, which had proper
facilities for long detention; that rights under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-46
(Supp. 1963) had been violated because he had not been properly arraigned;
that he had been inadequately fed (the evidence established that he was
offered four sandwiches a day); that he was beaten and continually ques-
tioned. The trial court found no merit in any of these contentions.
2 The federal district court, upon hearing for application of a writ of
habeas corpus, found that the defendant requested that the officer pray for
him. The state court record indicated that the idea of the prayer originated
with the police officer. Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770, 773 n.6 (4th
Cir. 1964).
'The terminology "voluntary" and "involuntary" is uncertain of meaning
but popular among the judiciary not to be used. See Kamisar, What Is
[Vol. 43
